Abstract-We study the complexity of finding extreme pure Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games and analyse how it depends on the graph topology and the number of users. In our context best and worst equilibria are those with minimum respectively maximum total latency. We establish that both problems can be solved by a Greedy algorithm with a suitable tie breaking rule on parallel links. On series-parallel graphs finding a worst Nash equilibrium is NP-hard for two or more users while finding a best one is solvable in polynomial time for two users and NP-hard for three or more. Additionally we establish NP-hardness in the strong sense for the problem of finding a worst Nash equilibrium on a general acyclic graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibria are one of the most common concepts in noncooperative game theory. The classic questions concerning these stable states of a game, in which no selfish user is unsatisfied and wants to change to a different strategy, are those of existence and uniqueness. Modern algorithmic game theory brings up additional questions such as computability of equilibria and the overall performance of the system under selfish behaviour. Pigou [1] gave a first negative answer by stating that in general selfish non-cooperative behaviour does not lead to social optimal outcome. Papadimitriou [2] introduced the coordination ratio as the quotient of the social cost of a worst Nash equilibrium and the minimal social cost. It is often called "Price of Anarchy" as it reflects the degradation in performance due to missing central regulation. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [3] established a model (KPModel) in which users of different size travel on parallel links with linear latency functions analogously to uniform/related machines in scheduling. The price of anarchy of this game and various similar models was studied extensively [4] - [7] . The problems of finding extreme (best and worst) Nash equilibria concerning makespan social cost for this model was studied by Fotakis et al. [8] , who established them to be NP-hard in the strong sense. These hardness proofs rely on the different sizes of users and the corresponding scheduling and bin-packing problems are easy to solve for unit-sized users. Additionally Epstein sperber@mathematik.uni-kl.de et al. [9] show all Nash equilibria for unit-sized users on parallel links to have the same makespan. Unit-sized users traveling through more complex graphs are modeled by network congestion games. Rosenthal [10] established the existence of pure Nash equilibria in these games. Fabrikant et al. [11] gave a polynomial time algorithm to compute an arbitrary Nash equilibrium for a symmetric (single-commodity) network congestion game by the use of a certain min-cost flow instance. On series-parallel graphs this min-cost flow instance can be solved by the Greedy algorithm GBR of Fotakis et al. [12] . Recently Gassner et al. [13] analysed extreme Nash equilibria in network congestion games for makespan social cost, measuring the latency of the longest path chosen by a user, and showed that finding a worst equilibrium is "easier" in the sense that a worst equilibrium can be found in polynomial time on series-parallel networks while establishing a best one is NP-hard on this topology. In contrast Awerbuch et al. [14] used the total latency as measure of social cost to establish bounds on the price of anarchy for network congestion games. This measure is very common also for the non-atomic network congestion game model, in which users only control a negligible amount of the overall traffic and thus the flow can be split arbitrary between different paths. In their seminal work Roughgarden and Tardos [15] proved that the price of anarchy for affine latency functions is 4/3. The question of extreme equilibria does not arise in this model, as for non-decreasing and continuous latencies Nash equilibria are essentially unique, i.e., all used paths (of one commodity) in a Nash equilibrium have equal latency and the total latency of two Nash equilibria of one single-commodity instance of the game is thus also the same [16] .
Contribution
We give a characterization of the complexity of finding Nash equilibria with minimum or maximum total latency in network congestion games with non-decreasing latency functions on edges. On parallel links both problems can be solved by the Greedy algorithm GBR [12] with tie breaking according to the increase in cost. But the problem of finding a best Nash equilibrium is slightly harder as this approach fails for nonincreasing latencies. The situation is more involved for series-parallel graphs: Unfortunately the problem of finding a worst Nash equilibrium is NP-hard even for two users. Here finding the best equilibrium is somehow easier, as we can find a best NP-hard for two or more users (Section IV-B) NP-hard in the strong sense on general acyclic graphs (Section IV-C) equilibrium for two users in polynomial time but the problem is NP-hard for three or more users. For finding a worst Nash equilibrium we additionally establish NP-hardness in the strong sense on general acyclic networks. The results are additionally summarized in Table I .
Roadmap
This extended abstract is organised as follows: In Section II we introduce the model of network congestion games as well as preliminary results and several examples to motivate the questions addressed in this work. We establish our results on finding a best Nash equilibrium in Section III and in Section IV for a worst Nash equilibrium, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a symmetric network congestion game, namely N unit-sized users each choosing a path from the source s to the sink t in the directed graph G = (V, E). The strategy set P of all users are thus all simple s-t-paths in G. We denote by n the number of vertices and m the number of edges of G. The edges are equipped with non-decreasing latency functions ℓ e : N 0 → R 0 + for all e ∈ E modeling the congestion effects. An instance of the game is thus given by
In our context a flow is a function f : P → N 0 that assigns integer values to paths in the network. The latency on a path is the sum of the latencies on its edges that depends on the total flow on the edge:
We denote by f e := P ∈P: e∈P f P the flow on edge e uniquely induced by the flow f defined on paths. Note that there may be different flow-decompositions or flows on paths that correspond to the same flow on edges. Even more, Gassner et al. [13] give an example that the property of a feasible flow to be a Nash equilibrium might depend on the flow decomposition. A stable state of the system is a choice of paths such that no user can benefit by deviating from her choice given those of the other users: 
Definition 2.1 (Nash Equilibrium, Nash Flow):
A flow f = (f P ) P ∈P is at Nash equilibrium, if and only if for all paths P 1 , P 2 with f P1 > 0 we have
Rosenthal [10] established that every instance of a network congestion game possesses a least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We want to analyse Nash equilibria with respect to an additional measure of quality:
Definition 2.2 (Total latency social cost):
The total latency C(f ) of a flow f in a network G = (V, E) with edge latency functions ℓ e is defined as
We additionally denote the highest latency experienced by a user as the makespan C max (f ) of a flow f :
Epstein et al. [9] established that on parallel links all Nash equilibria have equal and even optimal makespan. The situation is not as nice for total latency social cost:
Example 2.3 (Nash Equilibria with different social cost):
Consider the graph G consisting of just two nodes s, t and two parallel links e 1 , e 2 between them with latency functions ℓ e1 (x) = x and ℓ e2 (x) = x/2 as shown in Fig. 1 . Two users travel from s to t. In this setting there are two Nash equilibria: One sending all flow on edge e 2 for costs of 2 and the second one sending one user on each edge e 1 and e 2 resulting in lower costs of 3/2.
Even more, in general no Nash equilibrium is optimal concerning total latency even on parallel links:
Example 2.4 (No optimal Nash equilibrium):
Consider the graph G with two parallel links and latencies ℓ e1 (x) = x, ℓ e2 (x) = 2x + ǫ for 0 < ǫ < 1/2 as shown in Fig. 2 . Two users want to travel from s to t. The unique Nash equilibrium sends both users on edge e 1 for costs of 4, while the optimal solution splits the flow resulting in cost of 3 + ǫ.
Examples 2.3 and 2.4 motivate to study the following two problems:
Nash equilibrium f with minimum total latency Definition 2.6 (Problem WNash):
s ∈ V , t ∈ V , N ] Output: Nash equilibrium f with maximum total latency
We are going to examine the dependence of the complexity of both problems on the topology of the underlying network. Thereby, we look at parallel links, arbitrary (acyclic) graphs and series-parallel graphs. The latter are defined inductively as follows:
Definition 2.7 (Series-parallel graph):
A single edge e = (s, t) is series-parallel with start terminal s and end-terminal t by definition. Let G i be series-parallel with start-terminal s i and end-terminal t i (i = 1, 2). Then the graph S(G 1 , G 2 ) obtained by identifying t 1 as s 2 is a series-parallel graph, with s 1 and t 2 as its terminals (series composition). The graph P (G 1 , G 2 ) obtained by identifying s 1 as s 2 and also t 1 as t 2 is a series-parallel graph (parallel composition) with s 1 (= s 2 ) and t 1 (= t 2 ) as its terminals.
Obviously the set of series-parallel graphs contains parallel links as a special case but is a real subset of acyclic digraphs as the graph shown in Fig. 3 is not series-parallel due to the "shortcut" from v 1 to v 2 .
For our positive results we modify the algorithm GBR introduced by Fotakis et al. [12] which works as follows: The users are iteratively assigned to a path minimizing the latency induced by the users already assigned. To be more precise denote by f i the result of GBR in the ith iteration, f 0 the constant zero flow on all edges and
the minimum latency for a new (i + 1)st user. Thus GBR chooses a path P i+1 of user (i + 1) such that the latency on P i+1 is L + (f i ) after the assignment. Fotakis et al. [12] establish that this algorithm yields a Nash equilibrium on series-parallel graphs but fails to do so on general acyclic digraphs.
The path P i+1 is in general not uniquely determined by (1) but there is a set P + (f i ) of paths with minimal latency for an additional (i + 1)st user. We add tie breaking rules to chose a specific path from this set: Definition 2.8 (Greedy min and Greedy max ): In the following we denote by Greedy min the algorithm GBR that chooses among candidate paths P + (f i ) one with minimal cost increase:
Greedy
max denotes the analog algorithm which chooses a candidate path with maximal cost increase.
Observe that the running time of Greedy min [Greedy max ] is polynomial in the input size of the network congestion game on a series-parallel graph as in the (i + 1)th iteration we just have to find a lexicographic shortest s-tpath for the fixed edge labels (ℓ e (f i,e + 1), ∆c e (f i,e + 1)) [(ℓ e (f i,e + 1), −∆c e (f i,e + 1))], which can be done in linear time on these acyclic graphs with the help of a topological sorting of the vertices.
III. BEST NASH EQUILIBRIUM

A. Parallel links
On parallel links all local optima of Rosenthal's potential function are global optimum and thus all Nash flows can be found by the min-cost flow instance introduced by Fabrikant et al. [11] . In particular on this very easy topology every Nash flow can be found by GBR. Which Nash equilibrium is found depends on the tie breaking rule applied. We start with the case of increasing functions and establish that Greedy min really finds a best Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1: Greedy min solves BNash for increasing latency functions on parallel links.
Proof: We use induction on the number of users to show that Greedy min succeeds in finding a best Nash equilibrium. Let f i+1 be the result of Greedy min after (i + 1) iterations and g i+1 an arbitrary Nash flow in the same graph with also (i + 1) users which is not equal to f i+1 . Denote bȳ E := {e ∈ E : ℓ e (g i+1,e ) = C max (g i+1 )} the set of critical edges of g i+1 . Remember that the candidate set of edges for iteration (i + 1) of Greedy min is E + (f i ) := {e + ∈ E : ℓ e + (f i,e + + 1) = min e∈E ℓ e (f i,e + 1)}.
In a first step, we show that there exists an edgeē with e ∈Ē ∩ E + (f i ). For the sake of a contradiction assume that for all edgesē ∈ E we haveē ∈ E + (f i ) and letē be an arbitrary such edge.
Thus we know ℓē(g i+1,ē ) = C max (g i+1 ) = C max (f i+1 ) and ℓē(f i,ē + 1) > C max (f i+1 ). Monotonicity of the latency functions thus implies f i,ē + 1 > g i+1,ē . By integrality of the flow values we conclude
As f i+1 and g i+1 are not identical and the latencies are increasing, there must be at least one edge not critical for g i+1 . Let e ∈ E\Ē be an arbitrary such edge and thus ℓ e (g i+1,e ) < C max (g i+1 ). g i+1 being a Nash flow additionally gives us
As ℓ e is increasing and both flows g i+1 , f i+1 are Nash we can conclude either if ℓ e (f i+1,e ) = C max (f i+1 ) then g i+1,e + 1 = f i+1,e or if ℓ e (f i+1,e ) < C max (f i+1 ) then f i+1,e = g i+1,e . Together this implies that f i+1,e ≥ g i+1,e for all e ∈ E\Ē.
Equations (2) and (3) tells us that either g i+1 = f i+1 or f i+1 sends more users from s to t. This contradicts the choice of g i+1 and thus completes the proof of the first step.
In the second step, we are now ready to compare the cost of f i+1 and g i+1 : We have just established that there exists e ∈Ē ∩ E + (f i ). Hence, we know that ℓē(g i+1,ē ) = C max (g i+1 ) = C max (f i+1 ) and ℓē(f i,ē + 1) = C max (f i+1 ) and thus by ℓē being increasing
Decomposing g i+1 into one unit of flow on edgeē and a Nash flow g i with i users, we can compare the total latencies:
as Greedy min chose ei+1 ≥ 0
Thus we can conclude that f i+1 is a best Nash equilibrium.
The following example establishes that in general Greedy min does not work for non-decreasing latencies: Example 3.2 (Greedy min fails for non-decreasing latencies): Consider the graph G in Fig. 4 with 5 parallel edges between s and t. There is one edge e 1 with latency ℓ e1 (x) = 3 x = 1 6 x > 1 and the remaining four edges have latency ℓ ei (x) = 2x + 2, i = 2, .., 5. Nine users travel from s to t. Greedy min assigns the first user to edge e 1 , then in some order adds one user to each of the other edges. In the sixth iteration all edges are candidate edges and the algorithm compares the cost increase: Thus Greedy min assigns the remaining four users one to each of the edges e 2 ,..,e 5 which results in total latency 51. But assigning only one job to every edge e 2 ,..,e 5 and five users to e 1 is also Nash and has costs of 46.
B. Series-parallel graphs
In series-parallel graphs the best Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to be be found by GBR (with any tie breaking rule) for three or more users even for increasing latency functions.
Example 3.3 (Best Nash flow not found by GBR):
Consider the graph G shown in Fig. 5 in which three users travel from s to t. The solution f of GBR in G is unique and has a unique path decomposition sending one user on the lower edges e 2 and e 4 and the other two on the direct edge e 5 with costs C(f ) = 16. However, there is a Nash equilibrium f * with cost C(f * ) = 15 which sends one user on the direct edge e 5 and both other users on one upper edge e 1 (e 3 ) and one lower edge e 4 (e 2 ) such that all edges are used by exactly one user.
The good news is that for two users we can use Greedy min to find a best Nash equilibrium on series-parallel graphs in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.4:
Greedy min solves BNash for two users on series-parallel graphs.
Proof: The basic idea of the proof is to use induction on the number of composition steps necessary to construct G and compare the result f of Greedy min to an arbitrary Nash equilibrium g. The case of a series-composition is easy, as every equilibrium in the whole graph decomposes naturally in two, one in each component. For the case of a parallel composition we have to analyse different cases depending on whether f and g use both components or not.
In contrast to this positive result we can use a construction similar to Example 3.3 to establish (weak) NP-hardness of the problem to find a best Nash equilibrium for three or more users by a reduction from the Even-Odd Partition Problem.
Theorem 3.5:
The problem BNash is NP-hard on seriesparallel graphs for three or more users.
Proof: The proof of weak NP-completeness of the decision version of BNash uses a reduction from the Even-Odd Partition Problem stated NP-hard in Garey and Johnson [17] :
EVEN-ODD PARTITION PROBLEM (EOP) Given: Finite set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 2n }, a size w(a i ) ∈ Z + for each a i ∈ A and 2B = 2n i=1 w(a i ). Question: Does there exist a subset A ′ ⊂ A with a∈A ′ w(a) = B and A ′ contains exactly one element of {a 2i−1 , a 2i } for i = 1, . . . , n.
We may assume w.l.o.g. that w(a 2i−1 ) < 2w(a 2i ) and w(a 2i ) < 2w(a 2i−1 ) holds for i = 1, . . . , n.
Given an instance I(EOP) then an instance I(BNash) is defined by a graph G = (V, E) with V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , v n+1 } with two parallel edges between v i and v i+1 for i = 1, . . . , n and an edge e + = (s, t). The latency functions of the two edges between v i and v i+1 are ℓ(x) = w(a 2i−1 )x and ℓ(x) = w(a 2i )x for i = 1, .., n and ℓ e + (x) = (B/2)x. Three users travel from s = v 1 to t = v n+1 . Observe that I(EOP) is a YES-instance if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium f in G of I(BNash) with C sum (f ) ≤ 5B/2.
IV. WORST NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A. Parallel links
Analogously to the case of finding the best equilibrium in Theorem 3.1 we can establish a result for finding a worst Nash equilibrium for increasing latency functions by Greedy max . But for this case we can get even more as stated in the following theorem: Theorem 4.1: Greedy max solves WNash on parallel links for non-decreasing latency functions. We prepare the proof of Theorem 4.1 by a lemma. We adopt the notation of the proof of Theorem 3.1 and add the set M − := {e ∈ E|f i+1,e < g i+1,e } to compare the flow on edges. Lemma 4.2: Let f i+1 be the result of GBR (with any tie-breaking rule) on parallel links. For every other Nash flow g i+1 = f i+1 there exists an edgeē ∈Ē withē ∈ M − ∩ E + (f i ).
Proof: All edges e ∈ M − have latency ℓ e (g i+1,e ) = C max (g i+1 ) = C max (f i+1 ) and thus are elements ofĒ. Additionally we have g i+1,e > f i+1,e . If e = e i+1 and thus f i+1,e = f i,e this implies that e ∈ E + (f i ). For e = e i+1 we use e i+1 ∈ E + (f i ). As g i+1 = f i+1 we have M − = ∅ and thus there must be an edge with the desired properties.
Proof: [of Theorem 4.1] We analyse the costs by induction on the number of users assigned by Greedy max .
Therefore let f i+1 be the result of Greedy max after (i + 1) iterations and e i+1 the edge chosen in the (i + 1)st iteration. Denote by g i+1 an arbitrary Nash flow in the same graph with also (i + 1) users which is not equal to f i+1 . Using Lemma 4.2 we can decompose g i+1 in a way that the (i + 1)st user was sent on an edgeē ∈ (Ē ∩ M − ∩ E + (f i )). As both e i+1 ,ē ∈ E + (f i ) the tie breaking rule of Greedy max implies that
Hence, we can compare the costs of g i+1 and f i+1 :
Asē ∈ M − ∩Ē we know that g i+1,ē − 1 = g i,ē ≥ f i+1,ē . If e = e i+1 we conclude g i,ē ≥ f i,ē and ifē and e i+1 coincide even strict inequality holds. We distinguish two cases:
Case 2:
≤ 0
Thus (7), (8) together imply that the difference in cost described in (6) is negative. This proves that f i+1 is "worse" than g i+1 .
B. Series-parallel graphs
First of all we observe that GBR does not find a worst Nash equilibrium on series-parallel networks even for two users independent of the tie breaking rule applied:
Example 4.3 (Worst Nash flow not found by GBR):
Consider the series-parallel graph shown in Fig. 6 in which two users want to travel from s to t. GBR sends one user on path P 1 = {e 1 , e 3 } and the other one on P 2 = {e 5 }. The resulting Nash flow f has makespan C max (f ) = 6 and cost C(f ) = 10.
We compare this to the Nash flow g with g Q1 = g Q2 = 1 with Q 1 = {e 1 , e 4 } and Q 2 = {e 2 , e 3 }. This flow has also makespan C max (g) = 6 but cost C(g) = 12. Thus GBR does not find the worst equilibrium.
Observe that g 1 := g| G1 is not the worst Nash flow on G 1 for two users (neither for makespan nor cost), as sending both
Fig . 6 . Worst Nash equilibrium not not found by GBR (Example 4.3).
users on path P 1 induces costs of 16 but also a makespan of 8 and thus does not constitute a Nash equilibrium any more when G 1 and G 2 are composed in parallel. This tells us that a worst Nash flow in a parallel composed graph does not necessarily consist of worst Nash flows in the two components.
In the following we want to show that it is hard to find the worst Nash equilibrium in series-parallel graphs.
Theorem 4.4:
The problem WNash is NP-hard on seriesparallel graphs even for two users.
Proof: The proof of weak NP-completeness of the decision version of BNash uses a reduction from the Evenodd Partition Problem EOP as stated already in the proof of Theorem 3.5. Given an instance I(EOP) an instance I(WNash) is defined by the graph G = (V, E) as in the proof of Theorem 3.5 with the only difference that ℓ e + (x) = Bx. Two users travel from s = v 1 to t = v n+1 . Observe that I(EOP) is a YES-instance if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium f in G of I(WNash) with costs C(f ) ≥ 2B.
C. General topologies
Even more, we show that it is hard in the strong sense to find the worst Nash equilibrium in general graph topologies.
Theorem 4.5:
The problem WNash is NP-hard in the strong sense even on acyclic graphs with two users.
Proof: Consider an instance I(BlockP) of the strongly NP-complete Blocking Path Problem [13] :
BLOCKING PATH PROBLEM (BlockP) Given: Digraph G = (V, E) with source s ∈ V and sink t ∈ V . Question: Does there exist an s-t-path P ∈ P such that after deleting the edges of P there is no path from s to t?
An instance I(WNash) of determining a worst pure Nash equilibrium is constructed as follows: I(WNash) is defined on a graph G ′ = (V, E ′ ) which contains the same vertex set as G and E ′ = E ∪ {(s, t)}. Since G ′ is acyclic it is possible to define a bijective function π : V → {1, . . . , n} such that π(i) < π(j) if (i, j) ∈ E. Given any such bijection π the latency functions are given by ℓ e (x) = (π(j) − π(i))x, e = (i, j) ∈ E.
Observe that due to this definition of the latency functions of edges in G every path from s to t is a shortest path with respect to the edge lengths ℓ e (1). Let L * be the length of a shortest path from s to t in G with respect to edge lengths ℓ e (1) for e ∈ E. Then the latency of (s, t) is defined by ℓ (s,t) (x) = (L * + 1/2)x. Observe that there exists a blocking path P * for I(BlockP) if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium f in G ′ with cost C(f ) ≥ 2 · L * + 1/2.
